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Recently, Chau et al. [Phys. Rev. A 95, 022311 (2017)] reported a quantum-key-distribution
(QKD) scheme using four-dimensional qudits. Surprisingly, as a function of the bit error rate of the
raw key, the secret key rate of this scheme is equal to that of the (qubit-based) six-state scheme
under one-way classical communication using ideal apparatus in the limit of arbitrarily long raw
key length. Here we explain why this is the case in spite of the fact that these two schemes are
not linearly related to each other. More importantly, we find that in terms of the four-dimensional
dit error rate of the raw key, the Chau et al.’s scheme can tolerate up to 21.6% using one-way
classical communications, which is better than the Sheridan and Scarani’s scheme [Phys. Rev.
A 82, 030301(R) (2010)]. In addition, we argue the experimental advantages of the Chau et al.
implementation over the standard six-state scheme and report a corresponding proof-of-principle
experiment using passive basis selection with decoy states. We also compare our experiment with
the recent high secret key rate implementation of the Sheridan and Scarani’s scheme by Islam et al.
[Sci. Adv. 3, e1701491].
I. INTRODUCTION
In theory, the six-state scheme [1] is a power-
ful qubit-based quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme that tolerates higher channel noise (up to
12.6% bit error rate (BER) using one-way classi-
cal communication using non-degenerate code [2])
than the BB84 protocol [3]. However, it does not
attract much experimental attention because it re-
quires more optical components, making it more
lossy than the BB84 protocol [4]. Along a different
direction and based on an earlier work of Chau [5],
his group reported an N -dimensional-qudit-based
scheme that has exactly the same one-way secret key
rate formula as a function of the bit error rate of the
raw key for ideal equipment in the arbitrarily long
raw key length limit provided that N = 4 [6]. We
call their scheme the CWW174 scheme, where the
subscript refers to the Hilbert space dimension N of
the qudit used.
It is instructive to find out the underlying reason
for the agreement of the one-way key rate formulas of
∗ hfchau@hku.hk
† yinzq@ustc.edu.cn
‡ wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
these two schemes. Here we first show that the six-
state scheme cannot be imbedded in the CWW174
scheme and vice versa. Then, we argue that this key
rate agreement is out of a lucky coincidence.
Along a different line, Sheridan and Scarani [7, 8]
introduced a scheme using four-dimensional qu-
dits as information carrier that we called the
SS104 scheme. In their scheme, states are pre-
pared and measured either in the computational
basis {|j〉}3j=0 or its Fourier transformed basis
{∑3k=0 eπijk/2|k〉/2}3j=0. They showed that by using
ideal apparatus and single photon source and in the
limit of infinite raw key length, the SS104 scheme tol-
erates up to an error rate of 18.9% for qudit depolar-
izing channel [7, 8]. Although not explicitly defined,
it is evident from their analysis that they referred
to the four-dimensional dit error rate1 (DER) of the
raw key. And this translates to a tolerable BER
of 12.6%, which equals exactly that of the six-state
scheme. Nevertheless, by carefully studying their
1 That is to say, there are four possible measurement out-
comes for each qudit, say, 0, 1, 2, 3. The dit error rate refers
to the error rate of this sifted key expressed in dits. One
may convert this dit string to a bit string, say, by mapping
0, 1, 2, 3 to 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. And one may talk
about the BER of this sifted bit string key.
proof, it is clear that if Alice and Bob just care about
the average BER without looking into the three dif-
ferent four-dimensional DERs, their scheme can only
tolerate up to 11.0% BER just like the BB84 proto-
col because a channel that independently produces
spin flip and phase shift errors to each qudit will pro-
duce the same BER as a qudit depolarizing channel.
In fact, their proof implicitly showed that the secret
key rate of (the unbiased basis selection version of)
the SS104 scheme is 1.5 times that of the six-state
scheme partly because Alice and Bob has two rather
than three bases to choose from. We explicitly write
down their argument in Appendix A.
It is instructive to compare the theoretical and ex-
perimental performances of the CWW174 and the
SS104 schemes. Here we find that the CWW174
scheme can tolerate up to a DER of 21.6% in the
raw key using one-way classical communciation in
the infinite raw key length limit using ideal single
photon source and detectors, which is higher than
that of the SS104 scheme. Based on earlier success of
time-bin implementations [9–14] of the round-robin
differential-phase-shift [15], the Chau15 [5] and the
SS104 [16] schemes, it makes sense to implement the
CWW174 scheme via the time-bin representation.
So, we perform such an experiment using passive ba-
sis selection and decoy states, and discuss its prac-
tical advantages over the original six-state scheme
as well as comparing it with the recent implementa-
tion of a biased basis selection version of the SS104
scheme by Islam et al. [16].
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
SIX-STATE AND THE CWW174 SCHEMES
Recall that in the six-state scheme, Alice and
Bob prepare and measure qubits in one of the
basis states of the following three mutually unbi-
ased bases (MUBs) {|0〉, |1〉}, {(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2}, and
{(|0〉 ± i|1〉)/√2} [1]; whereas those states for the
CWW174 scheme using four-dimensional qudits are∣∣∣ψ±jk〉 ≡ (|j〉 ± |k〉)/√2 for 0 6 j < k 6 3 [6].
Here Bℓ = {|j〉 : 0 6 j < ℓ} is an orthonormal ba-
sis of the ℓ-dimensional Hilbert space. (Note that
Ref. [6] labelled the four basis states using finite
field notation to emphasize its underlying mathe-
matical structure. Here we just label them from
0 to 3 for the convenience of experimentalists.) In
the six-state scheme, the raw key bit of Alice (Bob)
is assigned to 0 if the preparation (measurement)
state is |0〉, (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 or (|0〉 + i|1〉)/√2. Oth-
erwise, it is assigned as 1 [1]. For the CWW174
scheme, the 12 preparation and measurement states
form three set of MUBs in the four-dimensional
Hilbert space. Therefore, each prepared or mea-
sured qudit corresponds to two raw bits. For in-
stance, for states prepared or measured in the basis
{(|j〉 + (−1)k|j + 2〉)/√2: j, k = 0, 1}, the raw bits
are j and k [6].
For generation of the final secret key from the raw
bits, we follow the standard Shor and Preskill pro-
cedure [17] adapted to the decoy state situation [18–
20]. using one-way classical communication. And for
simplicity, we use the so-called random key assign-
ment in the sense that whenever Bob does not detect
a signal, he will randomly and uniformly assign the
“measurement result” as one of the four pairs of bits
00, 01, 10 and 11. Finally, in case more than one of
the Bob’s detectors click, we randomly assign Bob’s
measurement result [21].
By considering a corresponding entanglement-
distillation protocol of four-dimensional qudits,
Chau et al. [6] proved that for ideal apparatus and
in the infinitely long sifted key length limit, the one-
way key rate of the CWW174 scheme equals to that
of the six-state scheme. But they do not know why.
In Appendix B, we show that although the six-state
and the CWW174 schemes have the same one-way
key rate as a function of the BER in the raw key
in the case of ideal source and detectors, they are
very different schemes in the sense that one cannot
be imbedded in the other. In simple terms, it means
that the preparation methods of these two schemes
are so different that they are not linearly related.
Consequently, we believe that they have the same
one-way key rate formulas in the ideal apparatus sit-
uation because of a lucky coincidence. And this co-
incidence comes from the following observation. As
Alice and Bob each randomly picks one of the three
MUBs, they in effect completely mix the phase and
spin flip errors in the quantum channel [6]. For the
CWW174 scheme, the worst-case one-way key rate
for a given raw key rate happens when the phase
and spin flip errors are independent [6]. Thus, this
worst-case key rate can be computed as if each raw
bit had passed through a depolarizing channel — the
very same situation of the six-state scheme.
III. ONE-WAY SECRET KEY RATE
FORMULAS FOR THE ORIGINAL AND THE
MODIFIED CWW174 SCHEMES
The one-way secret key rate formula for the
CWW174 scheme for ideal single photon source in
Ref. [6] can extended to the case of using standard
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FIG. 1. The secret key rates R of various protocols for ideal apparatus as a function of (a) the BER e and (b) the
DER e∗ in the raw key. In (a), the curves from the top to the bottom are the extremely biased version, the version
used in Islam et al. [16] and the unbiased version of the SS104 scheme, and the six-state scheme (and hence also the
CWW174 scheme). In (b), the curves from the top to the bottom are the extremely biased version, the version used
in Islam et al. [16] and the unbiased version of the SS104 scheme, the CWW174 scheme and the six-state scheme.
decoy state via the flagging method first explicitly
presented in Ref. [20]. (See Ref. [22] for detail.) It
is given by
R =
qQµ
s
{
−H2({Egµ}3g=0)
+min
3∑
g=0
Ωg[s−H2({δgp}p)]
}
, (1)
where s = 2 is the conversion factor from a
4-dimensional dit to 2 bits [5, 6], q = 1/3 is
the chance that Alice and Bob use the same
basis, Qµ =
∑+∞
n=0 Ynµ
n exp(−µ)/n! is the over-
all gain of the signal, Yn is the conditional
probability that Bob’s detector(s) clicks given
Alice emits n photons. Also, H2({xk}Nk=1) =
H2(x1, . . . , xN ) ≡ −
∑N
k=1 xk log2 xk is the binary
entropy function provided that
∑N
k=1 xk = 1,
Egµ =
∑+∞
n=0 e
g
nYnµ
n exp(−µ)/(Qµn!) is the overall
rate of the 4-dimensional signal dit with error g, and
egn is the corresponding conditional probability given
Alice emits n photons [20]. Here, g(= 0, 1, 2, 3) error
means that the bitwise addition modulo 2 of the
two corresponding raw secret bits of Alice and Bob
is g [5, 6]. (Using the example in the last sentence
of the second last paragraph, the least significant
bit of g is j and the most significant bit of g is k.)
Further, Ωg = Y1µ exp(−µ)eg1/Qµ is the fraction
of single photon that experience error g, and δgp is
the “phase error rate” of those dits in the raw key
with error g. Finally, the minimization is over all
δgp’s that are consistent with the deduced values of
eg1’s. Specifically, from Ref. [22] which extends the
work of Ref. [6], we have e01 = A + B + C + D,
e11 = 2(B + D), e
2
1 = 2(C + D) and e
3
1 = 4D with
A + 3B + 3C + 9D = 1 and 0 6 A,B,C,D 6 1.
Moreover, the BER of the single photon event in
the raw key is e = (e11 + e
2
1)/2 + e
3
1. Then, the
minimization (subject to a fixed e) is attained when
H2({δ3p}p) = H2({D/4D,D/4D,D/4D,D/4D}) =
2, H2({δ1p}p) = H2({B/[2(B + D)], B/[2(B +
D)], D/[2(B + D)], D/[2(B + D)]}), H2({δ2p}p) =
H2({C/[2(C + D)], C/[2(C + D)], D/[2(C +
D)], D/[2(C + D)]}) and H2({δ0p}p) =
H2({A/(A + B + C + D), B/(A + B + C +
D), C/(A+B + C +D), D/(A+B + C +D)}).
Let us also compute the secret key rate as a func-
tion of the DER of the raw key. By concavity of
the entropy function, the worst case secret key rate
occurs when E1µ = E
2
µ = E
3
µ and e
1
1 = e
2
1 = e
3
1 in
the infinite raw key length limit. Moreover, using
the notations in Ref. [6] (with the minor changes of
using labels 0 to 3 instead of labels in finite field
notations), e01 = e02 = e03 = e10 = e20 = e30 =
e11 = e23 = e32, e12 = e21 = e33 and e13 = e22 =
e31. Thus, {δ0p} = {e00/e01, e01/e01, e01/e01, e01/e01}
and {δgp} = {e01/eg1, e01/eg1, e12/eg1, e13/eg1} for all
g 6= 0. Combined with the constraints that e00 +
9e01 + 3e12 + 3e13 = 1 and the DER of the raw key
e∗ = 6e01 + 3e12 + 3e13, we may minimize the sec-
ond term in Eq. (1) to get the secret key rate. (See
Appendix C for detail.)
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Fig. 1 depicts the (one-way) secret key rates of
various QKD protocols for ideal photon source and
detector without the need of decoy. It shows that
the modified CWW174 scheme tolerates up to 14.4%
BER (or 21.6% DER), which is better than the six-
state and the SS104 schemes. Note that the modified
CWW174 scheme is better than the unbiased (ex-
tremely biased) version of the SS104 scheme when
the DER e∗ exceeds 14.4% (17.7%). This demon-
strates the advantage of the modified CWW174
scheme over the SS104 scheme for very noisy chan-
nel. Finally, we remark that the curves in Fig. 1
show the worst case secret key rates. In practice,
one should use Eq. (1) to compute the secret key
rate R because it takes the error rates eg1 for all g
into account. In a lot of cases, it gives a better value
of R that the worst case situation.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND
THEIR COMPARISON WITH OTHER QKD
SCHEMES
We now report to our CWW174 scheme experi-
ment using time-bin representation. Our implemen-
tation is shown in Fig. 2. At Alice’s site, a pulse
train with a repetition rate of 1 GHz is generated by
modulating a continuous wave laser using the first
LiNbO3 intensity modulator (IM1), and only two
random pulses indexed by j and k (j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
and j < k) in each packets of 4 time slots (4 ns)
are allowed to pass IM2. IM3 is employed to im-
plement the decoy states method [18, 19, 23], by
which each packet is randomly modulated into sig-
nal state (whose intensity is µ photons per packet),
and two decoy states (whose intensities are ν and υ
photons per packet respectively.). Naturally, infor-
mation leakage in single photon emission is decided
according to the security proof, and then decoy-state
method is straight-forward provided the phase ran-
domized weak coherent source is employed. Then,
the first phase modulator (PM1) adds phase −π/2
or π/2 on each pulse to encode the key bits, PM2
randomize the global phase of each packet. Finally,
a large attenuation is added on these encoded pulses
by a variable optical attenuator (VOA). Alice’s out-
put quantum state of each packet is
∣∣∣ψ±jk〉.
At Bob’s site, the passive scheme based on a
1 × 3 beam splitter (BS) is used to implement a
high-speed, stable, and low-loss decoding measure-
ment. Following the passive measurement-delay
choice, three unbalanced Faraday-Michelson inter-
ferometers (FMI) with ∆ = k − j ∈ {1, 2, 3} tempo-
ral delays are employed to make the jth pulse inter-
fere with kth pulse. One three-port optical circulator
(CIR), one 50 : 50 BS and two Faraday mirrors (FM)
constitute a FMI, whose two output ports are con-
nected to two channels of one single photon detector
(SPD), respectively. There are totally three double-
channel SPDs, and all detection events are recorded
by a time-to-digital convertor (TDC) that records
the time-tagged and which-channel information. (In
principle, we should add a narrow-bandwidth fil-
ter in Bob’s side to prevent wavelength-dependent
beam-splitter attack [24]. But as we are in effect
uisng a monochromatic laser source, we decided not
to do so in this demonstrative experiment to simply
matter.)
Compared to the active scheme, the passive ap-
proach of the variable-delay interferometer with
three delay values can be characterized as follows:
(i) Highspeed, the passive choice among three 1 ns,
2 ns and 3 ns delay FMIs has no speed limits in
principle [10]; (ii) Stable, three FMIs are insensitive
to polarization variations, and also independent, so
we can actively and independently compensate the
phase shift of each interferometer, which is placed
in small and separate ABS plastic case and on heat-
ing plate to keep its temperature a little above the
environment temperature. Each interferometer is
individually stabilized by controlling the current of
corresponding heating plate, the feedback signals in-
clude counts of SPD when only IM1 works and er-
ror rate during key distribution procedure; (iii) Low-
loss, the insertion loss (IL) of each FMI depends on
ILs of the CIR, BS, and FM, so the ILs of these three
FMIs are almost identical, and approximate to be
0.80 dB. Nevertheless, we have to point out that the
passive approach needs more SPDs, and also cannot
implement bias basis choices as easily as the active
scheme.
Albeit the present implementation shares the
same key rate formula with the six-state QKD proto-
col, they have its own features experimentally. The
main advantage of the present scheme lies in its less
demand for phase encoding. In fact, a main draw-
back of a time-phase coding six-state system is that
Alice must module her phase modulator with four
phases 0, π/2, π and 3π/2, but our scheme only
needs −π/2 and π/2 phases. Two-phase modula-
tion and Vπ peak-to-peak voltage facilitate the real-
ization of high speed QKD, since four-phase mod-
ulation is more complex than two-phase modula-
tion and V3π/2 peak-to-peak voltage is higher than
Vπ. In a word, CWW174 has a simple phase-coding
device, thus is particularly significant for practical
QKD networks.
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup. IM: intensity modulator; PM: phase modulator; VOA: variable optical attenuator;
PG: pattern generator; CIR: circulator; BS: beam splitter; FM: Faraday mirror; SPD: single photon detector; TDC:
time-to-digital convertor.
TABLE I. The length of fiber (l), the mean photon numbers (µ, ν and υ) per packet and yield (Q) per packet, error
rates (E1, E2, and E3), and the secret key rate per packet (R). By increasing optical misalignment intentionally,
additional observations of E2 and the corresponding secret key rate are listed in brackets.
l Intensity Q E1 E2 E3 R
50 km
µ 0.66 5.63× 10−3 0.216% 1.81% (15.1%) 0.217%
7.31× 10−4 (1.64× 10−5)ν 0.04 3.56× 10−4 1.24% 2.77% (19.4%) 1.24%
υ 0.0016 2.92× 10−5 13.4% 14.2% (20.4%) 13.4%
For each SPD, both channels are based on In-
GaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD), and op-
erated in gated Geiger mode with sine-wave filtering
method [25]. The two output ports of each FMI
are different, the output port from the 3rd port of
CIR includes about additional 0.40 dB IL compared
to the other one, which is connected to the channel
of the corresponding SPD with lower detection effi-
ciency. In order to achieve optimal performances and
low error rate, we first add a width discriminator to
remove the wider filtered avalanche signals in each
channel of SPD [26], and then set the measurement
time window to 800 ps in TDC for all SPDs. The av-
erage detection efficiency, dark count rate, and after-
pulse probability of these three double-channel SPDs
is approximately 20.23%, 2.58× 10−6 per gate, and
1.05%, respectively. Here, the IL of CIR from the
2nd port to the 3rd port and the reduction effect
by setting measurement time window have been in-
cluded in the detection efficiency, the dark count rate
of one SPD is the sum value of both channels.
The experimental results using standard telecom
fiber channels of length l = 50 km are listed in Ta-
ble I. The universal squash model [21] is applicable
to our experimental setup; and we used the data pro-
cessing procedure there to handle events with multi-
ple detector click. Actually, these events contribute
to no more than 0.003% of the raw key, which has
negligible effect on the secret key rate. The BER
and DER of the raw key are (0.216%+ 1.81%)/2 +
0.217% = 1.23% and 0.216% + 1.81% + 0.217% =
2.24%, respectively. With the data given in Ta-
ble I, we calculate the corresponding parameters
for single photon emission through standard decoy
states formulas [27], which are Y1 = 8.38 × 10−3,
e11 = e
3
1 = 0.21% and e
2
1 = 1.9%. According to
Eq. (1), the secret key rate is R = 7.31 × 10−4 per
packet for the original CWW174 scheme.
To verify the high error tolerance of the proposed
protocol, we intentionally lower the optical interfer-
ence to result in high E2, which are listed in the
brackets in Table I. We find that positive secret key
rate is achieved even when E2 equals 15.1% (which
means 7.88% BER and 15.5% DER). As a compar-
ison, let us consider a BB84 experiment with the
same experimental conditions of ours. More pre-
cisely, we consider a BB84 experiment in time-bin
representation in phase encoding and that we inten-
tionally lower the optical interference through the
same optical mis-alignment. Clearly, EBB84 in this
setup is E2. Besides, using the decoy state for-
mulas in Ref. [27], we arrive at Y1 = 8.38 × 10−3,
e1 = 20.5%. Hence, it is impossible for the BB84
scheme to generate a secure key using this setup.
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This example, therefore, shows the advantage of the
CWW174 scheme over BB84.
To compare our experiment with the recent ex-
periment by Islam et al. [16], we remark that their
experiment aimed at producing the highest possible
secret key rate (measured in unit of secret bit per
second rather than per packet). That is why they
applied a strong bias of 90% in choosing the compu-
tational (that is, the time-bin) basis. Besides, they
sent photons about 10 times faster than we do; and
they optimized the decoy intensities and probabilites
of using different decoys (though they did not show
these probabilities explicitly, making readers hard to
verify their computed secret key rates). Moreover,
in order to detect photons in the computational and
the Fourier transformed bases, they used 8 photon
detectors whereas we only use 3. Using similar com-
mercial fiber with l = 50 km, their observed DER
(for single photon events) is at least 3.73%, which
is higher than our 2.24%. This suggests that the
CWW174 scheme may also have an edge in actual
experimental setup in terms of noise control.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we show that the CWW174 scheme is
not linearly related to the six-state scheme although
they share the same one-way key rate. Although
these two schemes may be related to each other in
some subtle ways, say, due to some hidden symme-
try, we believe that it is simply a coincidence that
they share the same one-way key rate. We also per-
form experiments to demonstrate the ease of imple-
menting the CWW174 scheme in time-bin represen-
tation over the six-state scheme. Moreover, we show
the noise resiliency of the CWW174 scheme over the
BB84 scheme by artificially increasing the channel
noise to such a level that no secure key can be dis-
tilled out from the latter scheme while a secret key
can be generated from the former one though at a
very low rate.
Last but not least, one may consider the following
reduced CWW174 scheme. Instead of using a total
of 12 states — four states from each of the three ba-
sis, Alice and Bob may use the following three pairs
of states each chosen from a basis: (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2,
(|0〉 ± |2〉)/√2 and (|0〉 ± |3〉)/√2. That is to say,
Alice randomly prepares these states and Bob ran-
domly measures them in one of the three bases. In-
stead of two bits, they get one bit per transmitted
four-dimensional qudit that is prepared and mea-
sured in the same basis. Furthermore, they reject the
qudit if the measured state does not belong to the
two-dimensional Hilbert subspace used in the state
preparation. Using the argument in Ref. [6], it is not
difficult to show that the one-way key rate of this
modified scheme is less than or equal to half that of
the six-state scheme, with equality holds if none of
the qudits is rejected. (The factor of half in the key
rate comes from the fact that Alice and Bob use four-
dimensional qudits instead of qubits in transmitting
quantum information in the channel.) By consid-
ering all other possibilities, we see that out of the
possible reduced CWW174 schemes that uses a pair
of quantum state per basis, the above one already
gives the highest one-way key rate. In this regard, we
conclude that the CWW174 scheme, which uses four-
dimensional qudits in 12 states that associate with
three different bases is the minimalist round-robin
differential-phase-shift-type of scheme that achieves
the one-way key rate of the six-state scheme with the
least number of states and Hilbert space dimension.
This analysis shows the advantage of obtaining more
than one bit of raw key per channel use. However,
in practice, the performance of the proposed proto-
col may be not so strong, since there may be more
noises introduced in the detection process [28].
Appendix A: Secret key rate of the SS104
scheme with unbiased basis selection for ideal
apparatus and photon source in the infinite raw
key length limit
One way to see this is that just like the BB84
scheme, the key rate of the SS104 scheme equals
R = (2 − Hspin − Hphase)/(2 × 2) where Hspin and
Hphase are the entropies of the spin flip and phase
errors of the raw key, respectively. In addition, the
first and the second 2 in the denominator are due to
the conversion of a four-dimensional dit to a bit and
the use of two bases with equal probabilities, respec-
tively. For the unbiased protocol using both compu-
tational and Fourier transformed states to generate
the sifted key, Hspin = Hphase in the worst case sce-
nario. Therefore, R = (1 − Hspin)/2. When using
the DER as the figure of merit, the worst case situa-
tion occurs when Hspin = H2(1− 3e/2, e/2, e/2, e/2)
where e is the BER of the raw key (and hence the
DER of the raw key equals 3e/2). Consequently,
the secret key rate is 1.5 times that of the six-state
scheme. In contrast, if the BER is used as the fig-
ure of merit, the worst case situation occurs when
Hspin = 2H2(1−e, e). This gives the BB84 key rate.
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Appendix B: Proof of the unitary
non-equivalence between the six-state scheme
and the CWW174 scheme
Theorem 1. The six-state and the CWW174
schemes are not linearly related in the sense that for
any m,n > 0, there is no monomorphism imbedding
every normalized preparation state of the m qubits
for the six-state scheme to those of the n qudits for
the CWW174 scheme and vice versa.
Proof. The following three observations are needed.
First, no complex numbers a, b satisfy |a| =
|b| = |a ± b|/√2 = |a ± ib|√2. Second,
all normalized n qudit preparation states in the
CWW174 scheme can be written in the form∑3
j1,...,jn=0
αj1,...,jn |j1, . . . , jn〉 with exactly 2n non-
zero αj1,...,jn ’s each with the same magnitude of
2−n/2. Third, all normalized m qubit preparation
states in the six-state scheme can be written in the
form
∑1
k1,...,km=0
βk1,...,km |k1, . . . , km〉 with 2ℓ non-
zero βk1,...,km ’s, each with the same magnitude of
2−ℓ/2 for some ℓ > 0.
Now suppose the contrary that there is an injec-
tive linear operator L sending normalized prepara-
tion states of the m qubit six-state scheme to the
normalized n qudit CWW174 scheme. We consider
only the case of m = 1 here as the general case can
be proven in the same way. Applying the first two
observations to L|ϕ〉, where |ϕ〉 is one of the prepara-
tion states in the six-state scheme, we conclude that
〈j1, . . . , jn|L|0〉 = 0 whenever 〈j1, . . . , jn|L|1〉 6= 0.
However, this means L(|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 has to be a
sum of 2n+1 rather than 2n non-zero terms over the
basis B⊗n4 , which contradicts the second observation.
Suppose there is an injective linear operator L′
sending normalized preparation states of the n qu-
dit CWW174 scheme to the normalized m qubit six-
state scheme. By the Hilbert space dimension con-
sideration, we know that m > 2n. Again, we con-
sider only the case of n = 1 for the general case can
be proven in the same way. We may assume that
L′
∣∣ψ+01〉 = |0〉⊗m. (Otherwise, we simply amend a
unitary transformation on the m qubits after L′ to
make it so.) Consider L′
∣∣ψ−12〉 = |0〉⊗m−L′∣∣ψ+02〉 and
hence 〈0, . . . , 0|L′∣∣ψ−12〉+〈0, . . . , 0|L′∣∣ψ+02〉 = 1. From
observation three, this is possible only if L′
∣∣ψ+02〉
can be expressed as a sum of two non-zero terms
over the basis B⊗m2 , say, |0〉⊗(m−1)⊗ (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2.
The same argument plus the injectivity of L′ lead
to L′
∣∣ψ+03〉 = |0〉⊗(m−2) ⊗ (|0〉 + |1〉) ⊗ |0〉/√2, say.
However, this implies L′
∣∣ψ−23〉 = |0〉⊗(m−2) ⊗ (|0〉 ⊗
|1〉 − |1〉 ⊗ |0〉)/√2, which is not a preparation state
of the m qubit six-state scheme. Hence, L′ does not
exist; and this completes our proof.
We remark on passing that using the same idea in
the above proof, there is no monomorphism imbed-
ding every normalized preparation state of the m
qudits for the SS104 scheme to those of the n qudits
for the CWW174 scheme.
Appendix C: Detailed derivation of the secret
key rate formula for the CWW174 scheme in
the infinite raw key length limit as a function of
the DER
We need to minimize the second term in Eq. (1),
which can be rewritten as
min
3∑
g=0
Ωg
[
s−H2({δgp}p)
]
= Ω
[
s−max
3∑
g=0
eg1H2({δgp}p)
]
= Ω
{
s−max [H2({ejk}3j,k=0)−H2({eg1}3g=0)]}
= Ω
[
s+H2({eg1}3g=0)−maxH2({ejk}3j,k=0)
]
,
(C1)
where Ω =
∑3
g=0 Ω
g = Y1µ exp(−µ)/Qµ. Clearly,
the maximum in the above equation is attained
when e12 = e13. Combined with the sum rule
e00 + 9e01 + 3e12 + 3e13 = 1 and the expression for
the DER e∗ = 6e01+3e12+3e13, the H2({ejk}3j,k=0)
becomes a function of e∗, e01 only. By considering
dH2({ejk}3j,k=0)/de01 and d2H2({ejk}3j,k=0)/de201, it
is easy to see thatH2({ejk}3j,k=0) is maximized when
f(e01) ≡ e301− (1− 3e01− e∗)(e∗− 6e01)2 = 0 (C2)
in the domain [0, e∗/6]. As f(0) < 0, f(e∗/6) > 0
and df/de01 > 0 for e01 ∈ [0, e∗/6], there is an
unique root for f in the domain [0, e∗/6]. Substi-
tuting this root back to H2 maximizes it; and hence
we obtain the secret key rate through Eq. (1).
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